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THE EVALUATION OF COMPENSABLE
REGULATIONS: A RETURN TO
BEUSCHER'S DEFENSE OF
INVALIDATION
RICHARD 0. BROOKS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Donald Hagman's Windfallsfor Wioeoutst is a seminal legal work,
because it offers a comprehensive study and a comprehensive propo-
sal for compensating the losses of landowners and recapturing the
benefits to landowners-losses and benefits flowing from the activi-
ties of governments and private parties.
The law of Windfalls for Wqoeouts is appealing for one basic rea-
son: A law compensating undeserved loss by undeserved gain ap-
pears to reassert the explicit role of law in its rightful function as an
instrument of fairness.' Of course, the type of fairness sought is a
limited one. Donald Hagman and his co-authors of Windfalls for
* Director of Environmental Law Center, Professor of Law, Vermont Law
School; B.A., University of Chicago, 1956; M.A., University of Chicago, 1958; LL.B.,
Yale Law School, 1962; Ph.D., Brandeis University, 1974.
I. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE
CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978) [hereinafter cited as HAGMAN].
2. Rawls has articulated the fairness theory of justice. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (197 1). It is worth noting, however, that he distinguishes narrow legal formal
equity from broader social justice. Id. at 235-38. HAGMAN, supra note 1, does not
mention a concept of justice, since HAGMAN is not concerned with Rawl's "difference
principle" which focuses on protecting the least favored. HAGMAN clearly concludes
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WIveouts narrow their sights to the subject of land value capture and
compensation. This narrowing may result in an increase in equitable
treatment among real property owners, which, as the authors point
out,3 does not mean that justice has been achieved in society as a
whole. If we don't permit Hagman's narrower notion of equity
among real property holders to divert our attention from the broader
inequalities of our society,4 the restoration of fairness among middle-
class property owners could be the first step towards a return to the
basic principle that law is an explicit means to achieve justice.5 On
the other hand, total preoccupation with Hagman's pursuit of mid-
dle-class equity at the expense of social justice is a dangerous disabil-
ity, one which should be. avoided.6
In this Article I discuss the objects of justice-the "property" to be
redistributed through the windfalls-wipeouts scheme. More specifi-
cally, I examine the nature of the property which Hagman proposes
to redistribute, and whether such redistribution through compensa-
tory mechanisms is always possible.
Central to the idea of Windfalls for Wtoeouts is the translation of
the windfalls into money measurements to permit a compensation for
the wipeout. Justice is monetized and the fundamental nature of
property is correspondingly commercialized. This translation of
property into money equivalents is nowhere more apparent than in
Hagman's discussion of "Compensable Regulations."7 Hagman be-
lieves that either through legislative or court action, "significant"
wipeouts due to regulations should be compensated by money pay-
ments. 8
that windfalls for wipeouts is middle-class justice. See text accompanying notes 2-6
infra.
3. HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 155-68.
4. One could argue, of course, that the functioning of the legal system does pre-
cisely this: absorb the attention of lawyers to a narrow middle-class fairness at the
expense of larger social justice issues.
5. Other papers offered at a conference on this topic debate the appropriate stan-
dards of equity and their relationship to other values in our society such as efficiency
in the search to determine what losses and gains are "undeserved." Windfalls for
Wipeouts Conference, Vermont Law School, August, 1979.
6. One way to avoid such a disability is to analyze the "windfalls" (few) and
"wipeouts" (many) that the poor in American society suffer from the regulatory appa-
ratus. For a brief discussion of relief only for "little people," see HAGMAN, supra note
1, at 251.
7. Id. at 256-307.
8. Id. at pp. 31 et seq. on the omnibus scheme, pp. 44 et seq. on the specific "nar-
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Hagman notwithstanding, my conclusion is that certain selected in-
dividual and social values adhere to property, that these important
aspects of property are not translatable into money equivalents, and
that hence, these values cannot be redistributed by the state through
compensatory mechanisms. At the practical level, such a conclusion
leads me to reassert the need for invalidation of certain regulations
rather than compensating the victim of such regulation. Accordingly,
I return to the conclusions (but not to the reasoning) of Beuscher with
which Hagman so definitely disagrees.' I do not, however, regard
invalidation and compensation as mutually exclusive remedies, and,
therefore, I offer certain modest amendments to Hagman's grand om-
nibus scheme for compensation.
At the theoretical level, I face the difficult problem of reconciling
the ideal of fairness with the practical non-fungibility of property.
Obviously, if monetary compensation systems often cannot be used
to achieve complete fairness, what, if anything, can be used? Is one
bound to an inequalitarian status quo in these situations where com-
pensation is not appropriate? I discuss some incomplete proposals
for escaping this dilemma later in the Article.
II. HAGMAN'S POSITION ON COMPENSABLE REGULATIONS
Hagman neatly summarizes his position on compensable regula-
tions as follows:
When there is a harsh regulation constituting a taking, the court
shall require payment of damages while the invalid regulation
was in force. The court shall further hold the matter and permit
the local government to consider whether it wants to continue
the regulation in force and pay future damages. If the govern-
ment so indicates, the damages shall be the difference in the an-,
nual rental value of the property regulated and as it could be
validly regulated, with payments made annually so long as the
invalid regulation is continued in force. No property interest is
acquired.'
Hagman's argument is: 1) there are "harsh" regulations which do
constitute "takings;" 2) when a regulation is deemed to be "a taking,"
row scheme", and chapter II for compensible regulations. Hagman does not discuss
the possibility of compensating by exchange of land which could expand the practi-
cality and applicability of compensating approaches.
9. HAGMAN, supra note I, at 256-58.
10. Id. at 296.
1980]
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there should be compensation;' 1 3) the regulation should be compen-
sated in the form of damages (rather than the acquistion of interest);
4) the regulator should have the option of continuing regulation and
paying damages (as opposed to simply making a retrospective ar-
rangement or permitting the regulated to have the option); 5) the
amount of compensation would be the difference in the annual rental
value of the property regulated with annual payments so long as the
invalid regulation is in force.
Hagman buttresses his conclusion by arguing that the bulk of
scholarly opinion favors compensating regulations and that opinion
which does not, is mistaken.' 2 Hagman documents that legislatures
have provided for such compensatory mechanisms through the High-
way Beautification Act,'3 the Uniform Relocation Assistance and
Real Property Acquisition Policy Act of 1970,14 as well as state legis-
lation. 5 His discussion itemizes the variety of recent legislative pro-
posals for such compensation approaches.' 6 Hagman concludes
there has been judicial recognition "from constitutional cloth"' 7 and
he summarizes what other CANZEUS countries' 8 have adopted in
the way of compensatory schemes.19
In reading the conclusion that "American courts and legislators
might well find it in the public interest to tip-toe into the compensa-
ble regulation area,"20 Hagman does not explicitly relate to his chap-
ter on the omnibus scheme for windfalls for wipeouts which he sets
forth in the book, but, presumably, the entire chapter on compensa-
ble regulations can be construed as indirect support for his more gen-
eral recommendations for an omnibus scheme. On the other hand,
perhaps he is saying that compensable regulations are the first step
toward a broader windfalls for wipeouts approach. This ambiguity
11. This assumes the regulation would not be invalidated. Conversations with
Hagman suggest that he does not rule out invalidation, but his text does not indicate
that, nor does he indicate what the line is between compensation and invalidation.
12. HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 256-66, 290-97.
13. 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (1976).
14. 42 U.S.C §§ 4601-4655 (1976).
15. See Hagman, supra note 1, at 266-68.
16. HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 269-72.
17. Id. at 272-79.
18. The CANZEUS countries are: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, England,
and the United States.
19. Id. at 279-90.
20. Id. at 307.
[Vol, 19:27
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may be important to a complete evaluation of Hagman's argument,
because without the windfall recapture mechanism in place, money
may not be readily available for wipeout compensation.
A second tantalizing ambiguity in Hagman's argument is that he
never really tells us where he stands on the line between acceptable
regulation (without invalidation or compensation) and unacceptable
regulation. Hagman fails to discuss what a "harsh" regulation is. He
leaves unsolved the "taking" question. Hagman is so intent on argu-
ing for compensation rather than invalidation as a remedy and argu-
ing that no property interest should be acquired as part of that
compensation that readers are left with no real definition of the
"harsh" regulations for which compensation will be forthcoming.
21
Without agreement on the "taking issue," the smooth administration
of a windfall for wipeouts scheme collapses.
III. THE NEED FOR INVALIDATION TO PROTECT
INDIVIDUAL VALUES
A. Pragmatic Rationales for Invalidation
The central assertion in Hagman's chapter on compensable regula-
tions is that invalidation as a remedy for "harsh" regulations is a less
desirable policy than compensation. Hagman rejects some reasons
given by Beuscher for reliance on invalidation. 22 Among other asser-
tions, Beuscher argued that 1) the finances and operation of govern-
ment would be adversely affected; 2) the property might have other
uses; 3) invalidation was the best remedy against "arbitrary" exercise
of government power; and 4) the due process clause addition to the
compensation clause in the Constitution suggests that the Constitu-
tion's drafters believed that not all wrongful interference is compen-
sable.23 Some of these reasons have been reasserted in Agins v. City
of Tiburon,24 recently decided by the United States Supreme Court.
21. There are several places in the book where Hagman appears to assume a stan-
dard for an appropriate line between regulation and acquisition. See, e.g., HAGMAN,
supra note 1, at 515. In his omnibus scheme, he allows a 10% reduction not to be
significant,
22. Id. at 257, 290-93. I do not believe that Hagman answers Beuscher's last ob-
jection, based upon an appeal to the "due process" clause.
23. J. BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 538-550 (3rd
ed. 1964).
24 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), afl'd, 100 S. Ct. 2138
(1980).
1980]
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However, Hagman ignores the facts in "taking" cases, as reviewed
by Norman Williams, 25 facts which suggest that the court's invalida-
tion serves several pragmatic functions not easily handled by com-
pensation. Williams points out that in addition to looking at the
impact of the regulation on the value of the land, the courts look at
the legitimacy of the goals of the public activity involved, whether the
method chosen to regulate was overbroad or arbitrary, and the clarity
and administrative feasibility of the regulation in question. 6
Hagman, by turning a regulation into a readily available compensa-
tory provision, could discourage the court from using invalidation as
a flexible method for handling these problems. In reply, Hagman
could argue that if public compensation were available, the costs to
the public fisc would discourage adoption of regulations with inap-
propriate goals, overbroad programs, unclear regulations, and infea-
sible adminsitrative schemes. Thus, a flexible invalidation method
would not be needed. Alternatively, Hagman might argue that objec-
tions to regulations based upon these concerns identified by Williams
should properly be raised in court under other legal doctrines. Thus,
Hagman could plausibly argue that the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection clauses should be invoked. Such a position, however, invites
the observation: If invalidation takes place under the "taking" ra-
tionale or under other doctrines, Hagman's desire for an efficient sys-
tem of compensation is defeated.
Williams has pointed out that invalidation is likely to occur where
no carefully considered rationale exists for the regulation, where a
broad public interest is not being pursued, where municipalities have
been blatantly inconsistent in their policies, or where they have
sought to use regulations to deliberately lower their costs of acquisi-
tion.27 All of these circumstances probably involve situations where
proper planning has not occurred. Compensatory schemes, rather
than invalidation in these situations, will merely permit the states or
municipalities to buy their way out of planning defects. (Hagman
assumes that the increased cost of improper regulations would dis-
courage such regulations-an interesting if unproved hypothesis.)
Of course, Hagman points out that invalidation does not deter mu-
nicipalities from the above lamentable practices.28 This may be true
25. 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 162.06 (1975).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 293.
[Vol. 19:27
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although Hagman does not cite empirical evidence. (Such evidence
is needed!) In any case, the answer to making invalidation a more
effective tool may be to have a more detailed court remedy accompa-
nying the invalidation, requiring the municipality to engage in moreS29
adequate methods of planning and regulation.
Another major reason for invalidation (specifically related to the
"taking" doctrine) is that the property owner must receive a reason-
able economic return within a reasonable period of time.3" Obvi-
ously, this rationale best fits Hagman's proposal for the compensatory
alternative. As long as the values of private property are economi-
cally measurable, and such economic measurement "exhausts" or
covers completely the values of the property, compensation would be
appropriate. Thus, it is appropriate to limit Hagman's compensation
approach to "pure economic" situations, where other pragmatic con-
cerns or noncommercial values do not require invalidation. The
question, then, is whether in many situations there remain non-
quantifiable individual values in private property which are a pro-
tected core either within the constitutional "taking" rationale or the
due process clause, and if there are such values, must the court not
continue to employ the invalidation theory and remedy.
B. Non-Pragmatic Rationales for Invalidation
A recent treatise on the nature of private property suggests that
private property rights are based on a qualified claim of individuals
to the benefits of their labor, the utilitarian need of individuals to
acquire, possess, use and consume, partly as an expression of the
human personality, the need for a private property base for political
liberty, and the need of the human species for territorality.31 Such
claims and needs form the basis of non-quantifiable values at the core
of private property protection.32 Five lines of legal cases are sugges-
29. The courts have, of course, expanded their remedies in deciding other land
use issues, e.g., exclusional zoning. Perhaps the court should appiont referees and
hold the case under supervision until new valid legislation is passed.
30. See N. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, § 162.06.
31, L. Becker, Property Rights, Philosophic Foundations (1977). See also C. B.
MACPHERSON, POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO
LOCKE (1962), in which MacPherson argues that the seventeenth century view of
property in the United States embraced these broad economic values.
32. Id. Becker offers two other valid defenses of private property. One is based
upon the property basis for political liberty and the other on "surplus labor." Both
could be handled by forms of guaranteed compensation.
1980)
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tive of a growing respect for this non-quantifiable residuum of value
in private property.
First are those cases dealing with the due process clause. In Moore
v. East Cleveland,33 for example, the Court determined that East
Cleveland's housing ordinance, which limited occupancy of a dwell-
ing unit to members of a "single family" (defined as a limited cate-
gory of related individuals), violated the due process clause of the
federal Constitution. Most interesting was a concurring opinion by
Justice Stevens which argued that such an ordinance intruded upon
the basic property right of an owner to determine the intended com-
position of his or her household and that this property right was pro-
tected under a combination of the taking and due process clauses.
34
Under such a constitutional approach, one can imagine regulations
which result in the depreciation of significant non-economic benefi-
cial use (such as privacy) being invalidated by the courts.35 Fixing
the precise boundaries for the protection of property based privacy is
indeed quite difficult, and beyond the scope of this article.
A second series of cases indicating increasing respect for the non-
monetary aspects of property are those which limit the placing of un-
constitutional legislative conditions in government grants.36 In
discussing such constitutional limits upon legislative conditions in
government grants, Reich has observed that one of the functions of
property "is to draw a boundary between public and private power.
Property draws a circle around the activities of each private individ-
ual or organization. '37 These activities of private individuals and or-
ganizations are deemed not to be susceptible to the compensation of
government grants. Thus, the cases which place a constitutional limit
33. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Other Supreme Court cases resurrecting the property
doctrine are summarized in W. VanAlstyne, The Recrudescence ofProperty Rights as
the Foremost Princ#le of Civil Rights: The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 66, 66-82 (1980).
34. Id. at 513-21.
35. For a discussion of privacy as a value to be protected see C. FRIED, AN ANAT-
OMY OF VALUES, 137-55 (1970). For a discussion of the evolving relationship of
forms of work and property to privacy, see H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 109-
18 (1958).
36. For a discussion of these cases, see Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Con.
stitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935) (criticizing the government's power
to place conditions on constitutional rights in government contracts); Note, Unconsti.
tutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (1960) (criticizing the reasoning used by
the government and the courts to conditions on constitutional rights).
37. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
(Vol, 19:27
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on government grant conditions may provide precedents for limiting
the extent to which government compensation can be used at all to
pay for the losses resulting from a regulation which would intrude
upon "the activities of each private individual or organization." 8
A third suggestive analysis of cases pertaining to nonmonetary as-
pects of property is Bruce Ackerman's recent brilliant discussion of
the "taking" cases. 39 Ackerman suggests that the "taking cases" can
be best explained by the concept of "social property"-which any
"well-socialized" person should recognize as marking things as "lay-
man's things."4 If the state transfers the rightful possession, or de-
stroys, or renders the "layman's thing" useless without "ordinary
justification," the property has "been taken." "Social property" is
distinguished from "legal property" (stock, bonds, etc.), which are
not regarded in the same way, either by the layman or the court. Al-
though Ackerman implies that such ordinary layman's interpreta-
tions of property might be better discarded, his analysis suggests that
the ordinary "well-socialized" layman recognizes individual claims
to things which cannot be taken by the state in a certain way and
without a good reason. Hagman treats all property as "legal prop-
erty," easily compensated for. Such a treatment does not correspond
with the ordinary "well-socialized" layman.
A fourth line of cases are those placing a limit on the broad emi-
nent domain power, primarily for first amendment reasons. These
cases indicate there is some property government cannot buy.41 A
fifth line of cases reflects the courts' unwillingness to extend inverse
condemnation to the regulatory situation. This line of cases is cited
in Agins Y. City of Tiburon.42 In Agins, landowners brought an in-
verse condemnation action seeking damages and declaratory relief
from a "Planned Residential Development and Open Space Zone,"
with a density up to one dwelling unit per acre. The California
Supreme Court rejected the remedy of inverse condemnation for "an
excessive use of police power" citing Friedman v. City of Fairfax,43
38. Id.
39. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
40. Id. at
41. See Nichols, Eminent Domain: Constitutional Problems in the Taking of
Church Lands, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 191 (1978), (suggesting that the First Amendment
blocks condemnation of church property).
42. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), af'd, 100 S. Ct. 2138
(1980).
43. 81 Cal. App. 3d 667 (1978).
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and overruling Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto.' The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the finding that no constitutional taking oc-
curred.4 5
Preventing the direct intervention of the state by use of compensa-
tory regulations into the relationship between privately-owned goods
and the person who owns them is based, in some cases, on a respect
for the relationship between goods and the human personality. In-
validation alone can protect such a relationship. Compensation, ob-
viously, does not permit such a relationship to be maintained. This
view of property-which seeks to protect selected values adhering to
private property-is indirectly confirmed by Hagman's own reluc-
tance to extend his windfalls for wipeouts omnibus scheme to com-
pensation for personal property46 or the purchase of the "new
property" discussed by Reich. This reluctance to extend compensa-
tory schemes to personal property betrays Hagman's tacit recognition
of the non-economic values of at least some property. Unfortunately,
Hagman's recognition does not extend beyond the artificial distinc-
tion between real and personal property. Yet this distinction must be
replaced by a distinction between property serving certain important
personal values and property functioning in the economic market
place. It is this latter category of property which Ackerman labels
"legal property" and for which compensation schemes are better
suited.
Given the frequent overlap between property involving individual
values and economic property, courts will have to review taking cases
on a case by case basis. In specific cases the court can also prevent
the false appeal to personal values from functioning as a mask for
special treatment of economic interests. The flexibility of the invali-
dation tool should permit courts to recognize situations where impor-
tant non-economic values are at stake. If invalidation is successfully
invoked in certain cases where compensation would be fully appro-
priate, little harm occurs. Court review is necessary because appro-
priate exceptions cannot be easily articulated in any legislative
compensatory scheme.
44. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613 (1976). But cf Furey v. City of Sacramento, 598 P.2d
844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979).
45. 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
46. HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 291. The seventeenth century notion of common
property, as the private right to a common resource, as opposed to state property, was
recently discussed in PROPERTY (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1978).
[Vol, 19:27
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IV. THE NEED FOR INVALIDATION-To PROTECT THE SOCIAL
VALUES OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
The discussion above focuses upon individual values of privacy
and personality. But, certain urban and environmental values, which
are customarily viewed as social rather than private property values,
may be values to which an individual should be able to lay claim
through an interest in property. For example, the personal security
which an individual urban property owner has due to the presence of
neighbors' "eyes on the street" is quite real as proven by recent urban
planning literature. Although private values seem part and parcel of
an individual's claim to private property, a more revolutionary way
of viewing the matter is to conclude that invalidation under the tak-
ing and due process clauses serves to protect both the private and
social aspects of private property-values which cannot be protected
by compensation to one or a few individuals. The irony of private
property principles protecting social values adhering to property
needs further explanation.
Thus, paralleling the need to recognize the values of individuality
adhering to private property is the need to explicitly acknowledge the
social dimensions of the functions of private property. The social di-
mension of property may be found in the historians' description of
the eminent domain doctrine,4 7 the economists' view of property as a
public device for organizing economic decision making, the "insti-
tutionalists"'" recognition of the modem "fission" of private property
and public control of the parts of modem property's institutions,4 9
and the ecologist's recognition of the interconnection of the res of
property in one urban or ecological system.5"
These various insights into the social nature of property suggest
that one should begin with a recognition of its social functions. Un-
fortunately, Hagman's philosophical starting point for his study of
compensable regulations is an individualist's view of property. He
begins with individual claims to property and assumes that societal
regulation is an interference with these individual claims. This indi-
vidualist bias is illustrated in the following example.
47. See Nichols, supra note 39.
48. See general, Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property, Rights, 7
J, L. & ECON. II (1964).
49. A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959).
50. See J. SENECA & M. TAUSSIo, ENVIRONMENTAL EcoNoMics (1974).
1980]
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Suppose X owns a large wetland which he wants to fill and develop
and which, before development, has a fair market value of $50,000.
A wetlands regulation is passed which prohibits all uses beneficial to
the owner and results in a significant depreciation of $40,000 in the
value of X's property. There is a compensatory mechanism for
wipeouts. Assuming this regulation is deemed "harsh," in Hagman's
terms, compensation is made available. If the wetland could be val-
idly regulated resulting in a $10,000 depreciation, the damages would
be the rental value of $30,000 ($40,000 value under valid regulation
minus the $10,000 remaining value under invalid regulation).51
Unfortunately, such a neat "individualist" example does not mir-
ror the reality of how compensatory schemes are administered. The
administrators of the compensation schemes in Rhode Island,52 Mas-
sachusetts,53 and Connecticut 54 have reported that compensation
under the laws is currently not being paid, and would probably not
be paid, even if funds had been appropriated. 55 The administrators
reported that either: 1) the statute for compensation was never con-
sidered as a "serious provision" (Hagman would argue because no
corresponding windfall was available to fund it); or 2) the adminis-
trators never seriously considered using the clause because the natu-
ral resource involved was believed to be "really public;" or 3) because
any serious challenge by an individual property owner for compensa-
tion could be bargained away by permitting the owner to develop
some of the land; or 4) because the administrators would wait hoping
for monies from federal sources to acquire the relevant lands in fee.
The failure of compensatory schemes to work at the administrative
level is imitated by the courts. Courts do not treat these compensa-
tory schemes any different from non-compensatory regulations.
Under one interpretation of Hagman, the compensatory regulation
would permit a court to award compensation where, if no such com-
pensation were available, the court might uphold the regulation de-
51. HAGMAN, supra note 19.
52. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2-1-16 (Supp. 1978) (allowing courts to award damages as
compensation without finding that a taking has occurred).
53. MAss. ANN. LAWS Ch. 131, § 40a (Michie Law Coop. 1972) (providing for
compensation if court finds that property regulation constitutes a taking).
54. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-43a (1979) (providing for compensation if court
finds that property regulation constitutes a taking).
55. Telephone conversations with administrators of Connecticut's Dept. of Envi-
ronmental Protection, Rhode Island Dept. of Environmental Management and Mas-
sachusetts.
[Vol. 19:27
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spite a serious wipeout. Unfortunately, courts do not appear to
follow such Hagmanesque reasoning.
This practical failure of compensatory schemes has theoretical sig-
nificance. Borrowing from Hagman's language, those compensatory
schemes which have been adapted by requiring compensation, made
evident the true cost of the public good to the public. The failure of
these compensatory schemes merely means that when the public is
aware of the costs, it is unwilling to pay the freight. Why does the
public react this way?
First, the protection of natural resources such as wetlands by com-
pensatory schemes cannot be offered as "a public good" on a one-by-
one, wetland-by-wetland basis as would occur under a compensable
regulatory system. Potential public purchasers of any one wetland
would be unsure that all or enough land would be protected to fulfill
the inter-connected functions of wetlands. Hence, they may be reluc-
tant to buy any one wetland. Although the regulatory compensatory
system is implemented on a case-by-case basis, the value of the object
regulated is cumulative, e.g., a tidal or inland wetland may have pub-
lic value only as a part of a system of wetlands. The public is there-
fore unable to assure itself of the satisfactory purchase of many social
goods in question through a piecemeal compensatory regulatory
scheme. Equally important, given the past history of the public using
regulations without paying, the public will adopt a strategy of a new
kind of "freeriding;" the public will rely upon unchallenged regula-
tions whereever possible, seeking to avoid payment of compensation.
Hagman, in his compensation scheme, ignores the social and inter-
connected aspects of natural resources and the social context of their
regulation.
There is, however, a deeper individualist bias in Hagman's
thought. How would a social theorist approach the analysis of the
wetlands case described above? Assume society has claim to certain
"social goods" such as a water supply, a non-flooding landscape, and
a sufficient supply of wetlands to supply nutrients for fish and wild-
life. X chooses to take a portion of these social goods through devel-
opment of "his" land. Presumably, X should pay for these social
goods at an "appropriate" price if they are for sale. Ancient private
property rules which permit X to take funds from the store of social
goods through uncontrolled use of private property, are, in effect,
rules "regulating" the expropriation of the social goods by private
persons. These private property rules do not provide for proper com-
pensation to society for the social goods taken by X. Public nuisance
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law,56 of course, was a rudimentary method for repayment. Various
schemes of effluent fees5 7 are more sophisticated forms of seeking to
recover the value of the social goods X has taken.
Suppose, however, that a regulation is passed to stop X from using
his property in a way that results in his taking from the social goods
of society. Such a regulation could theoretically be "harsh" to soci-
ety, if it did notfuly stop X from taking social goods (either because
it was inadequately formulated or enforced).5 In this case, or from
this point of view, society should be "compensated" beyond the regu-
lation. Needless to say, Hagman does not discuss this compensation.
Hagman does point out, that a regulation, if non-compensatory,
may unnecessarily prohibit the individual from selling his property to
the public, whereas a compensatory regulation would permit such a
sale. Hagman emphasizes giving the individual the freedom to sell
his resources to society through compensatory regulations, but he
does not see how the individual may have to pay society for the use
of its resources. It is very revealing that Hagman worries about regula-
tions "harsh" to the individual private property owner, but not those
"harsh" to society.
There is a final, even deeper flaw in Hagman's analysis. Some au-
thors59 have pointed out that it is economically important whether
one begins with the assumption that the public has goods which it
may be willing to sell as opposed to assuming that the private person
owns all goods to be bought by the public in the case of regulation.
To quote from Seneca and Tausig:
Suppose that we begin, instead from the plausible assumption
that property rights to the air and other environmental resources
reside in the general public and cannot be appropriated by any
private parties without adequate compensation. With this as-
sumption it no longer makes sense to value a given level of air
quality by asking how much individuals in society are collec-
tively willing to pay for it, as they already own it. Instead, it is
56. In addition to Hagman's discussion, see W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
§§ 2.1-2.12 (1977).
57. See F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 31-38, 59-68, 134-137
(1977).
58. A recent study of Connecticut's tidelands program reveals a failure to protect
these resources. Coastal Area Managment Program, Study of Connecticut's Tide
Fund Permit Program (1979) (unpublished manuscript).
59. E.g., J. SENECA & M. TAUSSIG, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (1974).
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natural to ask for the minimum amount all individuals in society
collectively would be willing to accept as compensation to give
up their rights to all higher quality levels. The latter approach
yields a maximum estimate of the value of a given level of air
quality, and of the quality of environmental resources in general.
Why does the latter approach acquire a higher valuation than
the willingness to pay approach? The answer is that the original
assignment of property rights to the public gives it greater
financial ability to achieve a higher standard of consumption,
including the consumption of environmental quality.60
Hagman, of course, in his chapter on compensatory regulations,
assumes that property rests with the individual.
On the basis of these observations, I propose a compensation sys-
tem complementary to Hagman's system--one which compensates
society for regulations which inadequately protect its interest. How
would such a complementary system work? Or in other words, how
do we put social and individualist perspectives together? We can be-
gin with the private property rule orientation of Hagman. Let's as-
sume from the above example, we measure the amount of "wipeout"
to X of the regulation as $30,000. Subtracted from the amount of
compensation due to X will be the market value of the social goods
taken by X despite the regulation, if such goods were offered on the
market. If that amount were higher than the compensation due to
him (such as $50,000) then X would make a payment (such as
$20,000).
Does Hagman account for these amounts to be subtracted from
wipeouts added to the social windfall profits? First, Hagman argues
in the chapter on compensable regulations that he measured the
amount of the wipeout by the difference of the value in the property
under the minimally valid regulation and the value of property under
the invalid regulation. By doing this he is permitting recognition of
the social aspects of property "taken" by the property owner by per-
mitting some regulation without compensation.
This qualification is not contained in his broader definition of
wipeout,6 under his omnibus scheme, or in the definition of value of
property for wipeout determination under his narrower land use con-
trol scheme.62 Whether it is contained under his definition of wind-
60. Id at
61. HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 44.
62. Id. at 60-71.
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fall63 is dubious.
Hagman does approach concern for the social values of property in
the discussion in Chapter 16 of existing windfall mechanisms, such as
development exactions, impact taxes or other windfall devices. In
that chapter, Madelyn Glickfield, in her discussion of the sale of de-
velopment permission, proposes that the sale price for permission be
based upon criteria which include public costs engendered by the de-
velopment. Glickfield suggests that net costs of a proposal be esti-
mated based not only upon more readily valuable infrastructure
costs, but also upon other social costs, such as air pollution, and other
costs of the development diverging from the community's policies. 64
The author goes on to admit, however, that such an approach is not
feasible. Thus, Hagman and Glickfield recognize the social aspects
of property, but do not offer a feasible scheme for protecting them. It
is the lack o/feasibility of estimating net social benefts ofprojects which
leads awayfrom the rfned approach of determining quantitative mone-
tary compensation and, instead, leads to upholding the regulation with-
out compensation based on a rough judgment that the proposed
regulation protects a sufficient !f unspecied quantity of social costs.
Upholding the regulation is justfled without requiring compensation.
Alternatively, when such social costs appear minimal and the cost bur-
den upon the developer is immediate, substantial and obvious, the regu-
lation is invalidated. Thus, the rough "balancing approach" to the
taking question, intellectually unsatisfactory as it is, becomes the
practical answer in most situations.
Even if a more refined cost-benefit analysis is done, by estimating
net costs and benefits of a development proposal, the history of cost-
benefit analysis has revealed that there are a variety of social costs
and benefits which are not economically measurable.65 Moreover,
the agencies conducting such analyses are notoriously biased. Noth-
ing in Hagman's description of the windfalls-wipeout's agency sug-
gests that this agency would be any less biased. Courts must have the
power and legal doctrines necessary to review, check, modify and in-
validate any such cost-benefit analysis of the proposed agency, 66 or
63. Id. at 40.
64. Id. at 394-97.
65. Rosen, Cost-Benft Analysis, Judicial Review and the National Environmental
Policy Act, 7 ENVT'L. L. 363-81 (1977).
66. For an example of a similar court review of an environmental cost-benefit
analysis, see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir.
1972).
[Vol. 19:27
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol19/iss1/3
EVALUATION OF COMPENSABLE REGULATIONS
act as the first line decisionmaker in taking questions.
V. INVALIDATION AS A SOLUTION TO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF
MEASURING VALUES
67
A final reason for retaining the invalidation remedy rather than
relying upon compensation lies in the very real practical problems of
measuring economic values even if one is dealing with "legal prop-
erty." First, as stated above, Hagman has not provided a standard
for measuring the base level of compensation. He does not specify
which maximum regulation would be upheld as a base for both de-
termining a "taking" and establishing a base for measurement of
compensation. Second, he has not told us how to measure the market
value of the hypothetical valid regulation. Third, Miscyznski's study
of land use controls in the Hagman book suggests that the impact of a
given regulation is not only on the property in question, but upon the
property in the entire market.6" If compensation is to be recognized
as measurable or to be paid out at the time of passage of the regula-
tion,6 9 the measure of the value over the entire market seems to me
67. A reason for Hagman's efforts to establish compensable regulations is to
further equity by not placing the burden upon uncompensated property owners. Yet,
it is questionable whether his formula for compensation would treat uncompensated
landowners "equally."
For illustrative purposes assume there are two landowners, A and B, in a prime
farmland area, each owning 100 acres at an equal market value of $500,000. A wishes
to develop housing on one-half of his land and leave 50 acres for farmland. B wishes
to develop his entire parcel as a shopping center. Since there is a public desire to keep
farmland for farm purposes both are forbidden development opportunity by an
agricultural zone. A and B suffer a similar market loss in the value of their properties.
Consequently, both are compensated the same even though the social harm of A's
uses is clearly less than the harm of B's uses and despite the fact that B might sustain a
larger actual loss than A due to the regulation.
Assume further that A could cluster his housing which would leave 60 acres for
farming and B could arrange the shopping center to allow 30 acres for farming.
Should the relative cost of these arrangements to A and B be considered? Should the
relative development options for maximizing the social good of A and B and their
willingness to consider these options be considered in measuring the compensation
each should receive? This Article does not pretend to answer these questions. Nor
does it argue that invalidation remedies would result in more equitable treatment of
different property owners. Nevertheless, the development of a compensation system
dramatizes equity issues, which, if not resolved, may lead to a system which is more
demoralizing to its participants.
68. HAGMAN, supra note I, at 75-111.
69. This is Hagman's recommendation. HAGMAN, supra note 1, at p.302.
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(and to Hagman's coauthor)7 ° extremely difficult. Fourth, .specific
compensable regulations require compensation be given for damage
due to the regulation. Appraisal of damage "due to" is the most diffi-
cult calculation of all.
The difficulties in measuring provide a rationale for either uphold-
ing or invalidating a regulation rather than providing compensation.
Invalidation may be based upon the rough judgment that measure-
ment of compensation is so difficult, questionable and expensive, that
invalidation or upholding the regulation is the cheaper and less de-
moralizing alternative.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the thesis of this Article is that invalidation of regula-
tions rather than compensation is necessary to protect individual
non-fungible values adhering to property, to give courts flexibility to
weight many factors in the "taking" situation, to give courts the op-
portunity to review agency determination of the social dimensions of
property, and to invalidate "harsh" regulations whose damages can-
not be accurately measured. The retention of invalidation does not
prohibit the use of compensation for economic property, including,
where possible, measurement of non-economic costs and benefits. In-
validation is the appropriate remedy in situation where compensation
is inadequate.
I want to emphasize that my unwillingness to give full scope to
compensatory principles is not equivalent to an inequalitarian posi-
tion. As Hagman himself points out, windfalls and wipeouts are mid-
dle-class landowner problems. To the extent that I fail to support
such a system, the most I can be accused of being is an enemy of
middle-class equity. Moreover, the recognition and emphasis of the
social dimension of property provides support for those who benefit
from social regulations. To be sure, those persons benefiting from
such regulations may or may not be the poorer segments of our soci-
ety (depending on the regulation in question).- The distributive im-
pacts of regulation is a different question which should be handled by
other modifications to our present regulatory system.
If equity as a key term in justice is to be measured arithmetically
by the monetary value of the rights in question, any compensatory
scheme, such as Hagman's, will probably benefit the richer segments
70. HAGMAN, supra note 2, at 103-11.
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of society since they will have claims to a greater amount of measura-
ble wealth. If, on the other hand, equity is viewed as proportional
access to a wide range of monetary and non-monetary values, then it
is less clear that the wealthier are in a better position.7 Under this
broader concept of justice, non-monetary legal methods will be
needed to protect these values. Rather than focusing on ingenious
schemes for monetary compensation, we should be looking at legal
methods for the protection of non-monetary values in American soci-
ety.
71. The compensatory principle assumes that the equality of fairness or justice
can be properly measured out by compensatory principles. An analysis of the idea of
equality suggest that there are forms of equality which are not subject to quantitative
treatment, either because they are equalities of value, difficult to measure, or equali-
ties of preseciptive remedies (which may not be subject to more or less). See "The
Idea of Equality", pp. 303-350, The Great Ideas Today (1968) Britannica. Rawls re-
jects the notion of equality implicit in the concept of fairness because of the difficul-
ties of measurement and because such preportionate equality would give to some a
stronger claim to social resources based upon their natural inequality (p. 510).
RAWLS, A Theory of Justice(1971).
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